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ABSTRACT 
 
There is a considerable debate on the role played by market discipline in the banking industry. 
Using data for 207 banks across 10 Central and Eastern European countries, this paper 
empirically analyzes the disciplining role of interbank deposits. We find that market 
discipline has been effective in Central and Eastern Europe since the implementation of 
explicit deposit insurance. However, several factors affect the strength of this discipline. 
State-owned banks are not disciplined probably because they benefit from implicit insurance. 
Institutional and legal factors, and resolution strategies adopted by countries during banking 
crises also impact bank risk and the effectiveness of market discipline. Our results indicate 
that stronger regulatory discipline reduces risk but also weakens market discipline. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 Economists and bank regulators have shown a growing interest in favoring the reliance 
on market forces and higher involvement of private agents such as uninsured creditors to 
monitor banks (Flannery (2001), BIS (2003)). Concomitantly, the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision has designated market discipline the third of the three pillars of the 
regulatory framework. Market forces are assumed to reinforce bank capital regulation and 
supervision to ensure the safety of the banking system. However, for market discipline to be 
effective, several conditions must be fulfilled: market agents must feel at risk and must have 
sufficient information about the actual riskiness of banks (Hamalainen et al. (2005), Nier and 
Baumann (2006)). Thus, explicit deposit insurance with a coverage limit might serve as a 
signal that eliminates the unlimited coverage of the de facto implicit deposit insurance 
system.
1
 However, even in presence of explicit insurance other factors are likely to affect the 
incentives of uninsured creditors to monitor banks. Some banks can still benefit from implicit 
government insurance. For example, state-owned banks might be considered by uninsured 
creditors as implicitly insured which should remove their incentives to monitor them 
(Borisova and Megginson (2012)). Similarly, some country specificities might affect the 
effectiveness of market discipline. Angkinand and Wihlborg (2010) show for example that 
market discipline depends on the extent of explicit deposit insurance, as well as on the 
credibility of non-insurance of creditors. Banks face a combination of regulatory discipline 
and market discipline. Market discipline implies that the cost and availability of debt depend 
on bank risk. Regulatory discipline is based on risk-weighted capital requirements, insurance 
premiums and examination frequency and intensity (Billet et al. (1998)). Thus, the incentives 
of uninsured creditors to monitor banks might also depend on the strength of regulatory 
discipline: stronger regulatory discipline might weaken market discipline. 
 
The aim of this paper is to assess the effectiveness of market discipline and the factors 
affecting its strength in the Central and Eastern European context. While most of the previous 
studies focus on Europe or on the U.S. where financial markets are well developed and where 
                                                 
1
 Explicit or formal deposit insurance is different than implicit deposit insurance. Explicit deposit insurance is 
based on formal regulation through central bank law, banking law, or the constitution. These laws define for 
example the coverage limits and the funding mode of the deposit insurance system, and how bank failures will 
be resolved. In absence of explicit deposit insurance, the deposit insurance is implicit that is depositors are 
protected by the bank monitoring and regulatory authority which does so without specifying guarantees 
regarding the extent of the protection (Demirgüc-Kunt et al. (2005)). Most countries have henceforth explicit 
insurance schemes. 
3 
the potential instruments of market discipline are broad, we consider Central and Eastern 
European countries where the conditions of the effectiveness of market discipline may be 
doubtful and where the potential instruments of market discipline are almost inexistent.
2
 In 
fact, it is well-known that market discipline is likely to contribute to financial stability, but 
evidence from cross-country studies show that market discipline is possible only if it is 
promoted by rigorous accounting and auditing rules and in absence of generous deposit 
insurance schemes (Barth et al. (2004)). In other words, low-income countries would lack the 
prerequisites for market discipline and regulators would have to rely only on capital adequacy 
rules and bank supervision, the two first Basel II pillars. 
Besides, Central and Eastern European countries have implemented explicit deposit 
insurance in the 1990’s. Indeed, within the framework of the liberalization of their banking 
market, starting in the early 1990’s, they have implemented explicit deposit insurance systems 
to comply with the European Union (EU) Directive on Deposit Insurance and to deal with the 
banking distress that they suffered at the beginning of their transition process. The existence 
of an implicit insurance beforehand, that covered most creditors (large and small), had 
presumably undermined market discipline. The implementation of explicit deposit insurance 
should have created the conditions for effective market discipline. 
 In this paper, using bank-level and country-level data under explicit deposit insurance 
from 1995 to 2006 for 10 countries, we examine the effectiveness of market discipline by 
focusing on deposits and more specifically interbank deposits which are explicitly uninsured. 
We question whether banks that are more reliant on interbank deposits take less risk. We also 
investigate how some aspects of regulatory discipline and some bank specificities affect the 
effectiveness of market discipline by influencing the incentives of uninsured creditors to 
monitor banks. Specifically, we investigate the following empirical questions. First, we test 
the effectiveness of market discipline on government controlled banks assuming that these 
banks are less prone to market discipline. Indeed, state-owned banks might benefit from an 
implicit insurance from the government. Second, we examine whether higher deposit insurer 
power weakens the impact of interbank deposit on bank risk-taking. We assume that the 
disciplinary role of interbank deposits weakens as regulatory discipline is stronger.  Third, we 
analyze the impact of the previous banking crises resolution strategies on the effectiveness of 
                                                 
2
 Indeed, there are only few listed banks which limits the use of indicators based on equity markets. Similarly, 
subordinated debt which is an instrument frequently used in the literature on market discipline (Sironi (2003), 
Morgan and Stiroh (2001)) cannot be used for these countries because of illiquidity issues: very few banks issue 
subordinated debt and only for small amounts. 
4 
market discipline. We assume that the effectiveness of market discipline is higher in countries 
that have pursued liquidation strategies rather than recapitalizations. 
  
 The key findings are as follows. First, we find that under explicit deposit insurance 
(which has been implemented in the 1990’s), interbank deposits do play a disciplining role in 
Central and Eastern Europe. However, we also find that several factors affect the 
effectiveness of market forces. Interbank deposits do not moderate the risk behavior of state-
owned banks presumably because of an implicit and unlimited insurance perceived for such 
banks by market participants. The effectiveness of market discipline is also affected by the 
regulatory environment and notably the resolution strategies adopted by each country during 
banking crises and the power of the deposit insurer. Our results indicate that when regulatory 
discipline is strong, market discipline is undermined. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature 
and explains how this work extends the existing literature. Section 3 presents our sample, 
variables and method. The empirical results are presented in section 4. Section 5 is dedicated 
to robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.  
 
 
2. Related literature and research focus 
 
Many empirical studies have addressed the issue of the existence and the effectiveness 
of market discipline. Several types of agents can discipline banks. Some papers focus on the 
discipline exerted by depositors. For example, Martinez-Peria and Schmukler (2001) show, 
using a sample of banks from Argentina, Chile and Mexico, that depositors withdraw their 
deposits from bad banks or require higher interest rates on their deposits, suggesting the 
presence of market discipline, even among small-insured depositors. Boot and Greenbaum 
(1993) establish theoretically that, when banks raise funds, the cost of funds is related to the 
bank’s risk profile. Banks face lower costs when they invest in safe assets than when they 
invest in risky assets. A broad literature focuses on subordinated debt holders showing that 
the spreads on subordinated debt reflect bank riskiness (Flannery and Sorescu (1996), Jagtiani 
et al. (1999)). Other papers show that indicators based on equity prices can reflect bank 
riskiness (Curry et al. (2008), Gropp et al. (2006)). The conditions of effectiveness of market 
discipline are also studied by some authors showing notably that, for market discipline to be 
5 
effective, market agents must feel at risk and must have sufficient information about bank 
riskiness (Hamalainen et al. (2005), Nier and Baumann (2006)).  
 
Our paper is more specifically related to a strand of the literature on market discipline 
focusing on interbank deposits. Indeed, making banks themselves the monitors of others 
banks, assuming that similar institutions might be expected to better identify a peer’s risk, has 
been often encouraged in the literature. Under such an approach interbank deposits form the 
ideal tool to ensure the effectiveness of market discipline. Such deposits are not covered by 
explicit deposit insurance schemes. Besides, banks are likely to be informed investors on the 
interbank market. As the lending bank may be directly affected by a sudden change in the 
health and soundness of the borrowing bank, interbank deposits should be sensitive to the risk 
taken by the borrowing bank. Rochet and Tirole (1996) indicate that as banks are particularly 
good at identifying the risks of other banks and have incentives to monitor other banks in an 
interbank borrowing relationship; the extent of interbank exposures may contribute to restrain 
bank excessive risk taking and reduce the risk of bank failures. Thus, interbank deposits can 
generate market discipline and perform a complementary task to bank regulation and 
supervision by public authorities.  
However, the empirical literature on the ability of banks to identify the risk of other 
banks is scarce. One of the first papers using interbank deposits as factors of market discipline 
is that of Furfine (2001), which analyzes the pricing of interbank lending agreements. The 
author investigates the risk pricing on the fed-funds market and finds that borrowing banks 
with higher profitability, higher capital ratios, and fewer problem loans pay lower interest 
rates than others when they borrow overnight. King (2008) also finds, using data on the U.S. 
interbank market between 1986 and 2005, that the rate a bank pays for interbank loans 
depends to some extent on its riskiness, particularly its credit risk, and the reliance on these 
funds tends to decrease as their cost rises.  
Other papers suggest that interbank deposits can be considered as a market discipline 
factor that contributes to limit bank risk-taking. Nier and Baumann (2006) test whether factors 
associated with the strength of market discipline, specifically the proportion of deposits 
received from other banks, lead banks to choose higher capital buffers for a given level of 
asset risk. Considering individual listed banks from 32 different countries over the years 1993 
to 2000, they find that banks holding a higher proportion of interbank deposits have greater 
incentives to limit their insolvency risk by choosing a larger capital buffer. Dinger and Von 
Hagen (2009) also show, considering a sample of banks from Central and Eastern Europe 
6 
(CEE), that interbank borrowing is associated with lower risk taking of borrowing banks. 
Cocco et al. (2009) examine the importance of relationships, measured by the intensity of 
pair-wise lending activity, in the process of liquidity provision on the interbank market. Using 
data on the Portuguese interbank market between January 1997 and August 2001, they find 
that relationships are an important determinant of banks’ ability to access interbank market 
liquidity. Banks with a larger imbalance in their reserve deposits are more likely to borrow 
funds from banks with which they have a relationship, and to pay a lower interest rate on 
these loans. Besides, they find that small banks and banks with a higher proportion of non-
performing loans tend to rely more on relationships when borrowing funds on the interbank 
market.  
 
This paper extends earlier works in several directions. First, while most of the existing 
literature focuses on developed countries, we consider Central and Eastern European 
countries which have less developed banking industries and financial markets. These 
countries have introduced explicit deposit insurance systems relatively later than other 
countries, in the 1990’s. Investigating market discipline is of particular interest in the case of 
these countries because the conditions of its effectiveness appear less favorable than in other 
countries. Moreover, because market discipline is expected to be weaker in such a context 
because of less developed financial markets it is important to determine what factors could 
improve its strength and reliability. Second, we focus on the discipline within the interbank 
market by looking at interbank deposits. Because stock markets and bond markets are 
relatively narrow and less liquid than in western countries, we do not deal with the role played 
by subordinated debt holders which has been the main concern of numerous U.S. studies. We 
consider that banks are likely to be informed investors and therefore risk-sensitive lenders 
because their (interbank) deposits are not insured. Third, we explicitly focus on the 
effectiveness of market discipline in the presence of explicit deposit insurance schemes. 
Indeed, the introduction of explicit insurance is beneficial for market discipline in countries 
where implicit insurance was broad in the absence of explicit insurance. Explicit deposit 
insurance is expected to create the conditions for the effectiveness of market discipline by 
credibly excluding some creditors from the perspective of a bail out in the event of bank 
default and interbank deposits are explicitly excluded from the deposit insurance scheme. 
Fourth, we investigate how some aspects of banking supervision and bank specificities might 
affect market discipline. For example, state-owned banks might benefit from an implicit 
insurance from the government. In this case, market discipline could be weaker for such 
7 
banks. Thus, we take into account several features likely to impact the effectiveness of market 
discipline: the power of the deposit insurer, the existence of an implicit insurance through 
state guarantee and the resolution strategies adopted in each country during the banking crises 
they experienced to assess the credibility of imposing losses to uninsured creditors in case of 
bank failures.  
 
 
3. Sample, variables and method 
 
Before presenting our set of variables and the method, we provide information about 
our sample of banks and the collected data.  
 
3.1. Sample 
 
Our sample consists of commercial banks established in 10 Central and Eastern 
European transition countries: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.
3
 Accounting data (annual financial statements) for 
individual banks are obtained from Bankscope Fitch IBCA. The sample period is from 1995 
to 2006. However, since our focus is on the disciplinary role of interbank deposits and 
because a necessary condition for market discipline to be effective is that creditors are 
credibly excluded from any guarantee, we restrict our analysis to the period covering the 
presence of an explicit deposit insurance scheme. Our argument is that the disciplinary effect 
of interbank deposits will be effective only when such liabilities are explicitly excluded from 
any formal guarantee i.e. after the introduction of explicit deposit insurance. Thus, the actual 
starting date for each country in our sample is the date of introduction of explicit deposit 
insurance.
4
    
 
                                                 
3
 26 banks in Bulgaria, 27 in Czech Republic, 6 in Estonia, 24 in Hungary, 21 in Latvia, 9 in Lithuania, 40 in 
Poland, 18 in Romania, 19 in Slovakia, and 17 in Slovenia. 
4
 This date is 1993 for Hungary, 1994 for the Czech Republic, 1995 for Poland, 1996 for Bulgaria, Lithuania, 
Romania, and Slovakia, 1998 for Estonia and Latvia, and 2001 for Slovenia.  
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Bankscope reported for the period under study balance sheets and income statements 
for 324 commercial banks for the countries we consider in this study. We delete 117 banks 
with less than 4 consecutive years of time series observations. This restriction allows us to 
compute our dependent variables using 4-year rolling windows. Our final sample consists of 
207 banks. Table 1 shows some descriptive statistics for the raw sample of 324 banks and the 
final sample of banks we use. The univariate statistics of these two samples are very similar. 
Besides, on average as of 2006, the final sample of banks constitutes over 89.23% of the total 
commercial banks’ assets of the different sample countries (the lowest is 65.35% for Poland 
and the highest is 98.55% for Bulgaria).
5
 By considering some key accounting ratios on our 
final sample, we notice that deposits account for a large share of total liabilities. On average, 
banks receive 76.16% of deposits relatively to total assets. On the asset side, the average 
value of the net loans to total assets ratio is equal to 44.59%. Considering profitability, the 
average ROA equals 0.98%. In terms of capitalization, the average equity to total assets ratio 
amounts to 13.18%.  
 
 
< Insert Table 1 > 
 
 
3.2. Presentation of variables 
 
We present our dependent variables reflecting bank risk and the different independent 
variables introduced in our estimations. Descriptive statistics regarding these variables are 
given in Table 2. 
 
< Insert Table 2 > 
 
 
3.2.1. Bank risk measures 
We consider several variables reflecting bank risk which are all computed on the basis 
of 3-year rolling windows but also 4-year rolling windows for robustness considerations. We 
take the Z-SCORE as a measure of individual bank default risk. The Z-SCORE is defined as: 
                                                 
5
 For the other countries the percentages are as follows (in 2006): 90.24% for Czech Republic, 98.06 for Estonia, 
80.59% for Hungary, 98.12% for Latvia, 98.82% for Lithuania,  80.69% for Romania, 88.86% for Slovakia and 
93.06% for Slovenia. 
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/ZSCORE =(ROA+EQTA) SDROA  
 
where ROA is the 3-year rolling window average return on assets defined as the ratio of net 
income to average total assets, EQTA represents the average ratio of equity to total assets and 
SDROA stands for the 3-year rolling window standard deviation of the return on assets. All 
the ratios are in percentages. The Z-SCORE has been widely used in the literature as a 
measure of bank default risk (see Roy (1952), Hannan and Hanweck (1988), Boyd et al. 
(1993) and De Nicolo (2000)). A lower Z-SCORE value indicates a higher probability of bank 
failure.  
As measures of banks’ assets risk, we use the 3-year rolling window standard deviation of the 
return on assets (SDROA) and the 3-year rolling window of the standard deviation of the 
return on equity (SDROE). A higher standard deviation indicates higher risk taking.   
 
3.2.2. Market discipline factor 
 
To examine empirically the hypothesis that market discipline is effective in providing 
incentives for banks to limit their risk, we need an indicator of market discipline. We follow 
Nier and Baumann (2006) and consider a measure of market discipline based on uninsured 
liabilities. This variable is the share of deposits received from other banks in total deposits 
(MKD). By nature, interbank deposits are not covered by explicit deposit insurance schemes, 
and this is the case in all the countries of our sample. Besides, banks are likely to be informed 
investors in the interbank market. A lending bank may be subject to the same risk as the 
borrowing bank. Consequently, interbank deposits are likely to be sensitive to the risk the 
borrowing bank is taking. The share of subordinated debt in total liabilities is an alternative 
variable used in several studies, including that of Gropp et al. (2006) and Sironi (2003), 
showing that subordinated debt spreads reflect the risk profile of the bank. Thus, subordinated 
debt holders are apparently able to correctly assess bank risk. However, note that, in our 
sample, there are at least 50 percent of banks which did not issue subordinated debt, and 
among banks which issued subordinated debt during the period under study, most of them 
provide information only for one or two years on our sample period. For this reason, we 
solely focus on interbank deposits. Table 2 shows that the average value of the ratio of banks 
deposits to total deposits is equal to 28.57% with a great deal of heterogeneity across banks 
10 
as shown by the standard deviation (26.47) and by the extreme values of this ratio (the lowest 
value is equal to 0% and the highest to 100%). 
 
3.2.3. Control Variables 
   
 In our empirical analysis, we include a set a control variables known to affect the 
riskiness of individual banks. These variables capture individual bank characteristics and 
reflect macroeconomic factors, the institutional environment and the regulatory and 
supervisory process at the country level.  
 
3.2.3.1. Bank characteristics 
We consider several control variables at the bank level. We include the natural 
logarithm of total assets (LTA) as a proxy of bank size. The nature of the relationship with 
bank risk is ambiguous. Indeed, larger banks are assumed to have a greater ability to diversify 
their risk and thus should have more stable earnings reducing their insolvency risk. However, 
in the presence of a too-big-to-fail (TBTF) policy, larger banks might have incentives to take 
higher risk, as indicated by Galloway et al. (1997), and Beck and Laeven (2006). We also 
control for bank capitalization defined as the ratio of equity to total assets (EQTA).
6
 We also 
control for banks’ business model. We make use of the ratio of net interest income to net 
operating income, NII, to proxy bank business model.
7
 This variable is also a proxy of bank 
product diversification used in many studies (Stiroh (2004), Lepetit et al. (2008a, 2008b)), a 
lower value indicating stronger expansion towards nontraditional intermediation activities. In 
the case of U.S. banks, Stiroh (2004) finds that greater reliance on noninterest income, 
particularly trading revenue, is associated with higher risk and lower risk-adjusted profits. 
Lepetit et al. (2008a) find that a heavier engagement in commission and fee activities implies 
                                                 
6
 Table A1 in appendix A presents the correlation matrix of the independent variables used in this study. The 
correlation coefficients are low except for bank size as measured by the natural logarithm of total assets (LTA) 
and the ratio of equity to total assets (EQTA). To see if the correlation between these variables affects our results, 
we have separately introduced total assets (LTA) and the ratio of equity to total assets (EQTA) as independent 
variables. We have also estimated another equation where we have orthogonalized LTA with the ratio of equity 
to total assets (EQTA). These specifications lead to results qualitatively similar to those obtained by 
simultaneously introducing LTA and EQTA. Thus, the results presented in the paper are those obtained without 
orthogonalizing these two variables. 
7 As a robustness check, we use the ratio of net loans to total assets as an alternative proxy for the bank business 
model. The results do not qualitatively change and are available on request. 
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higher risk for western European banks. Thus, we expect that, ceteris paribus, banks with a 
higher ratio of net interest income to net operating income will be less risky. Differences in 
ownership can also affect bank risk. Specifically, we consider the influence of state 
ownership. We construct a dummy variable (STATE), that takes the value of 1 if the share of 
state ownership in bank total ownership is higher than 50 percent, and zero otherwise. Several 
studies have found that state ownership leads to inefficiency and poor performance. For 
example Barth et al. (2004) and Berger et al. (2005) find that state-owned banks have higher 
ratios of non-performing loans to total loans. This can be explained by the fact that the 
managers of such banks are often under pressure to serve particular political interests.  
We also control for the existence of state saving banks. These banks were the only or 
the most important suppliers on the interbank market. Besides, they benefited from full state 
deposit guarantee. To control for these specificities, we identify these state saving banks
8
 and 
construct a dummy variable (SAVING) that takes the value of 1 if the bank is a state saving 
bank.
9
  
 
3.2.3.2. Country characteristics 
We also consider country-level variables that might affect bank risk.
10
 We take into 
account the annual growth rate of the real Gross Domestic Product (GDPG) to control for 
business cycle fluctuations and the overall economic conditions. Demirgüc-Kunt and 
Detragiache (2000) suggest that risk-taking incentives of banks managers might depend on 
                                                 
8
 The state saving banks indentified in our sample are: DSK Bank Plc (Bulgaria), Ceska Sporitelna a.s (Czech 
Republic), Eesti Hoiupank - IAS-Estonian Savings Bank – IAS (Estonia), OTP Bank Plc (Hungary), Latvijas 
Kraj Banka-Latvian Savings Bank (Latvia), Swedbank AB (Lithuania), Powszechna Kasa Oszczednosci Bank 
Polski SA - PKO BP SA and Bank Polska Kasa Opieki SA-Bank Pekao SA (Poland), Casa de Economii si 
Consemnatiuni-Romanian Savings Bank (Romania), Slovenska sporitel'na as-Slovak Savings Bank (Slovakia). 
9
 We check the status of these banks each year. The dummy variable SAVINGit takes the value of one for bank i 
on year t only if bank i is a state saving bank on year t. As a robustness check, we consider another definition for 
the state saving bank dummy variable. We assign the value one during the entire period for the identified state 
saving banks. As such, we consider that former state saving banks could still be different from other banks 
notably in terms of risk taking. Considering this alternative definition leads to similar conclusions. We also 
check that introducing both SAVING and STATE in our regressions is acceptable regarding colinearity issues. 
The correlation coefficient between these two variables is equal to 0.289 (Appendix A). Running our regressions 
without STATE or without SAVING does not impact our conclusions. The results are available on request. 
10
 Alternatively, we have considered country characteristics through the introduction of country dummies. Our 
conclusions remain unchanged (see robustness checks in section 5). However, as it is not possible to introduce 
both country dummies and country-level indexes because of colinearity issues, we only consider country level 
indexes.   
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the quality of law enforcement. We therefore control for the quality of law enforcement using 
the summary measure of law and order (LAW) that we borrow from Pistor et al. (2000). A 
higher index reflects a higher quality of law enforcement and reduces incentives to engage in 
fraud and strategic default at the expense of creditors. We also control for the design of the 
deposit insurance regime as in Pasiouras et al. (2006). We construct a dummy variable 
reflecting the power of the deposit insurance authority (DIPOW). This dummy variable takes 
the value 1 if the power of the deposit insurance authority is high and 0 otherwise.
11
 We 
expect that a more powerful insurer is more likely to tackle moral hazard issues and that 
banks engage in lower risk taking in a country with a stronger deposit insurance authority. 
Finally, to account for differences across countries in terms of resolution strategies adopted 
when the country has experienced banking crises or severe banking distress, we include a 
dummy variable (RESOL). Indeed, according to Tang et al. (2000) and Dinger and Von 
Hagen (2009), the crisis resolution strategies pursued by the countries of our sample fall into 
two broad categories: (i) extensive restructuring and recapitalization of banks which 
corresponds to Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovakia which 
were reluctant to let incumbent banks fail and (ii) a combination of bank liquidation and 
restructuring for Estonia, Latvia, Romania, and Slovenia. The dummy variable RESOL takes 
the value of one for banks from countries that have proceeded to a combination of bank 
liquidation and restructuring, and zero otherwise. Claessens and Laeven (2003) show that 
different approaches in terms of resolution of banking crises have led to very different 
outcomes in terms of economic growth after the crisis. We assume that these specificities 
could affect bank risk-taking incentives and that such incentives should be lower in countries 
that have experienced actual liquidations.
 12
 
 
3.3. Method 
 
  To examine the impact of interbank deposits on bank risk, we estimate the following 
panel data model: 
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 Deposit insurer power is determined by adding 1 if the answer is yes and zero otherwise for each of the 
following questions: (1) Does the deposit insurance authority make the decision to intervene in a bank? (2) Can 
the deposit insurance agency take legal action against bank directors/officials? (3) Has the deposit insurance 
agency ever taken any legal action against bank directors/officials? The dummy variable DIPOW takes the value 
of one if the deposit insurer power is high that is if the number of “yes” answers is 2 or 3, and 0 otherwise.  
12
 Note that the summary measure of law and order (LAW), the deposit insurer power (DIPOW) and the banking 
crisis resolution strategies (RESOL) are not time-varying variables. 
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RISK MKD X Z u                                 (1) 
 
with 
, ,i j t
RISK  a proxy for bank i risk taking in country j at time t; 
, ,i j t
MKD  a variable 
reflecting market discipline,
, ,i j t
X  a collection of variables that capture bank i characteristics at 
time t in country j; 
,j t
Z  a vector of factors at the country level such as macroeconomic and 
institutional environment factors that are expected to affect bank risk at time t. k and 
'
h  are 
vectors of parameters and i and t  the individual and time fixed effects.
13
  
 
A necessary condition for market discipline to be effective is that some creditors are 
credibly excluded from any guarantee. Before the introduction of explicit deposit insurance 
implicit guarantees were broad. The introduction of explicit deposit insurance by credibly 
excluding some creditors from the guarantee is expected to favor the effectiveness of market 
discipline. Thus, we consider the disciplinary effect of interbank deposits when they are 
explicitly excluded from the guarantee that is after the introduction of explicit deposit 
insurance. For countries where explicit deposit insurance was introduced before 1996 (Czech 
Republic, Hungary, and Poland), the estimation is computed on the entire sample period 
(1995-2006). If explicit deposit insurance was introduced after 1995 (Bulgaria, Lithuania, 
Romania, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, and Slovenia), the estimation period begins with the 
introduction of explicit deposit insurance
14
 
 
In our sample several banks have experienced mergers or acquisitions during the 
1995-2006 period. It seems inappropriate to calculate mean values or standard deviations to 
compute our dependent variables for such banks as their balance sheets have been totally 
modified by these events. Instead of removing these banks from our sample, we split them 
into two different entities
15
: we consider the bank after the merger or acquisition as a bank 
different from the one before the event. This applies to 19 banks in our sample.  
                                                 
13
 The regressions include individual and time fixed effects as the Fisher test rejects the null hypothesis of 
homogeneity in both individual and time dimensions.  
14
 See footnote 5. 
15
 This is done only if the merger or acquisition takes place after 1995 and before 2005 in order to be able to 
compute our dependent variables which are based on standard deviations. If it is not the case, we do not split the 
bank into two entities but we delete the observations before the event if it takes place before 1996 or the 
observations after the event if it takes place after 2004. 
14 
 
The descriptive statistics of our variables indicate highly skewed and heavy tails 
distribution of variables suggesting the presence of outliers. Thus, we follow John et al. 
(2008) and conduct residual diagnostic analyses and exclude outliers.
16
 In the regression with 
the standard deviation of ROA (SDROA) as a proxy of risk taking, 67 observations are 
excluded. In the regression with the standard deviation of ROE (SDROE) as a proxy of risk 
taking, 45 observations are excluded and 33 observations in the regression with the Z-SCORE 
as a proxy of default risk. 
 Finally, equation (1) is estimated on the sample excluding outliers with standard errors 
robust to heteroskedasticity.
17
  
 
 
4. Empirical results 
 
 
4.1.  Effectiveness of interbank deposits as a market discipline factor 
 
 
The results of the impact of interbank deposits on bank risk-taking are presented in 
Table 3.
18
 For each of the reported specifications, we find that the market discipline variable 
(MKD) is significant. A higher proportion of interbank deposits translates into lower levels of 
bank risk taking and a lower probability of failure. This effect is not only statistically 
                                                 
16
 In order to detect outliers, we run OLS regressions and calculate the Cook’s values. Cook’s value (D) for the 
i
th
 observation is a measure of the distance between the coefficient estimates when observation i is included and 
when it is not, and it is defined as 
2
2
si pi/ ri
i
e (s s )
D =
k
 ; where sie  refers to standardised residuals, ris to standard 
errors of the residuals and pis  to the standard errors of the prediction. k represents the number of independent 
variables plus the intercept term. High values of Cook’s distance imply that ith observation has significant 
influence on estimation results, therefore, can be deemed to be an outlier. For more details see Cook and 
Weisberg (1982). Then, we drop any observation if its Cook’s value is greater than 4/n, where n is the number of 
observations in the regression (see Hamilton (2006) for more details). 
17
 Alternatively, we have kept outliers and run outliers robust estimation, by following Covitz and Downing 
(2007), Laeven and Levine (2009) and Houston et al. (2010) and using the natural logarithm of the bank risk 
measures (Z-SCORE), the standard deviation of the return on assets (SDROA) and the standard deviation of the 
return on equity (SDROE)) to limit the impact of outliers. This method leads to similar conclusions.   
18
 All our regressions are run under explicit deposit insurance as mentioned in 3.1 and 3.3. It ensures that 
interbank deposits are explicitly excluded from guarantee. Indeed, before the introduction of explicit deposit 
insurance, implicit guarantees were broad which should deter market discipline. We have tested the influence of 
the introduction of explicit deposit insurance on market discipline by running our regressions on the whole 
period (1995-2006) for all countries and controlling for the existence of explicit deposit insurance. The results 
that are presented in Appendix B confirm that market discipline is only effective in the presence of explicit 
deposit insurance. 
15 
significant but also economically noteworthy. Indeed, considering the specification where the 
risk-taking proxy is the standard deviation of ROE (SDROE), a one standard deviation 
increase in interbank deposits (MKD) decreases the risk-taking proxy by 20.88% of its mean 
(from 7.99 to 6.32).
19
 The concomitant drop in the standard deviation of ROA (SDROA) 
amounts to 17.71% of its mean (from 1.05 to 0.87). The economic impact of interbank deposit 
on the insolvency risk proxy (Z-SCORE) is also important. Indeed, a one standard deviation 
increase in interbank deposit is associated with an increase in the Z-SCORE of 10.33% of its 
mean (from 33.11 to 36.53). 
Finally, the regressions results indicate that market discipline is effective and leads to 
a reduction in banks' riskiness and an improvement of their solvency. 
As far as control variables computed at the bank level are concerned, we find that bank 
size measured by the natural logarithm of total assets (LTA), has a positive and significant 
effect on Z-SCORE, and a negative and significant effect on the standard deviation of return 
on assets (SDROA) and on the standard deviation of return on equity (SDROE). These results 
indicate that larger banks take less risk and are less vulnerable (lower default probability). The 
ratio of equity to total assets (EQTA) has also a significant effect on bank risk-taking 
measures. Indeed, as expected, we find a positive and significant relationship with the Z-
SCORE and a negative and significant relationship with the standard deviation of the ROE 
(SDROE) and the standard deviation of the ROA (SDROA), which suggests that better 
capitalized banks are less vulnerable and take less risk. The dummy variable STATE is 
negatively and significantly related to the standard deviation of the ROE (SDROE). 
Unexpectedly, state owned banks appear to take less risk than other banks possibly because 
most banks that are not owned by the state are foreign institutions. As noted by Mian (2006), 
foreign banks may actually have a preference for higher risk locally as they can more easily 
diversify themselves internationally.
20
 Similarly, state saving banks appear less risky as the 
dummy variable controlling for these banks (SAVING) has a significant and negative effect on 
the standard deviation of ROA (SDROA). As expected, the business model proxy, i.e. the ratio 
                                                 
19 Note that the mean values of our risk-taking and insolvency risk proxies are slightly different from the values 
reported in Table 2 (descriptive statistics) because of the use of unbalanced panel data and outliers’ diagnostic 
method in our regressions.  
20
 A closer look at the descriptive statistics of state-owned banks and those of privately owned banks shows that 
the dispersion of returns of state-owned banks is lower than that of private banks, but also that state-owned 
banks exhibit a lower profitability measured by the return on equity. Thus, lower risk taking by state-owned 
banks may be explained by the fact that these banks engage in activities with lower returns. 
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of net interest income to total operating income (NII) has a negative coefficient in the 
regression with the standard deviation of ROA (SDROA) as the dependent variable, indicating 
that banks with a higher ratio of net interest income to total operating income are less risky.  
Considering the control variables at the country level, several appear significant. The 
annual growth rate of the real Gross Domestic Product (GDPG) and the law index (LAW) are 
significant, whatever the dependent variable, with the expected sign indicating that higher 
quality of law enforcement and higher annual growth rate of the GDP are associated with 
lower risk-taking and lower default probability. The resolution strategy variable RESOL also 
affects both the insolvency risk of the bank as measured by the Z-SCORE and its asset risk as 
measured by the standard deviation of the ROE (SDROE) or ROA (SDROA). We find that 
banks' insolvency risk and asset risk are lower in countries that have experienced actual 
liquidations. The power of the deposit insurer (DIPOW) also plays an important role as it is 
significantly linked with both the standard deviation of the ROE (SDROE) and the standard 
deviation of the ROA (SDROA). Banks in countries with higher power of the deposit 
insurance authority take less risk.  
By comparing the impact of our dummy variables reflecting institutional and bank 
specific factors, we find that in countries that have experienced actual liquidations the 
standard deviation of ROE (SDROE) is reduced by 6.540 whereas a high power of the deposit 
insurer allows a larger decrease of the standard deviation of ROE (8.399). State ownership 
allows a slightly lower decrease in bank risk taking, as measured by the standard deviation of 
ROE, by 5.849. Considering the standard deviation of ROA (SDROA) as the dependent 
variable, only the power of the deposit insurer (DIPOW) and the resolution strategy (RESOL) 
affect bank risk with a larger impact for the resolution strategy: in countries that have 
experienced actual liquidations the standard deviation of ROA (SDROA) is reduced by 1.028 
and only by 0.376 when the power of the deposit insurer is high. Thus, the resolution strategy 
(RESOL) and the power of the deposit insurer (DIPOW) are the factors that have the most 
important impact on bank risk. Considering banks’ insolvency risk (Z-SCORE), among the 
dummy variables, only the resolution strategy has a significant impact.  
 
< Insert Table 3 > 
 
 
To summarize, our results indicate that market discipline is effective. The importance 
of interbank deposits in total liabilities has an effect both on bank risk and bank default 
probability. However, several features might affect the effectiveness of market discipline. 
17 
Indeed, in presence of explicit deposit insurance the extent of the power of the insurer is 
expected to play an important role. The importance of state ownership might be also an 
important factor reflecting the existence of an implicit insurance through state guarantee. 
Finally, likelihood for uninsured creditors to actually suffer losses in case of bank failures 
might depend on the resolution strategies adopted in each country during the banking crises 
they experienced.  
 
4.2.  Factors affecting the effectiveness of market discipline. 
 
   Our main results indicate that interbank deposits play a disciplinary role in presence of 
an explicit deposit insurance scheme. In this section, we study if differences in bank 
ownership or differences in banking regulation and supervision across countries may 
influence the effectiveness of market discipline.  
 
4.2.1. Implicit insurance through state ownership  
         First, we focus on the influence of state ownership on the effectiveness of market 
discipline. More precisely, we test the potential difference in market discipline effectiveness 
between state-owned banks and other banks. We hypothesize that state-owned banks may 
benefit from an implicit insurance from the government. Therefore, market discipline may be 
weaker for such banks.  
To test this hypothesis in all our regressions, we interact the market discipline factor 
(MKD) with the state ownership dummy variable (STATE). The results, presented in Table 4, 
are consistent with our hypothesis. Indeed, we find that, for private banks, our market 
discipline variable (MKD) is significant in all the estimations. Based on the specification with 
the standard deviation of ROE (SDROE) as the dependent variable, a one standard deviation 
increase in interbank deposits (MKD) decreases the risk-taking proxy by 23.88% of its mean 
for private banks. Regarding the standard deviation of ROA (SDROA) for private banks, the 
fall amounts to 24.58% of its mean. The economic impact of interbank deposits on the Z-
SCORE is also important for private banks, since a one standard deviation increase in 
interbank deposits is associated with an increase in the Z-SCORE of 11.07% of its mean. 
However, the results of the test at the bottom of Table 4 indicate that the market discipline 
variable is not significant for state-owned banks. Therefore, market discipline is effective only 
for private banks and is associated with both a lower insolvency risk as measured by the Z-
SCORE and lower risk taking measured by the standard deviation of the ROA (SDROA) and 
18 
the standard deviation of the ROE (SDROE). This result suggests that, uninsured creditors 
perceive the existence of an implicit insurance for state-owned banks and do not exert market 
discipline on them.  
 
< Insert Table 4 > 
 
 
 
        4.2.2. Deposit insurer power 
         We now explore how market discipline might be affected by the deposit insurer power. 
Indeed, both markets and regulators impose a discipline. Markets penalize banks for 
increasing risk by increasing the costs of their market funding and by limiting the types of 
claims they can issue. Regulators impose discipline through risk-based capital requirements 
and insurance premiums, examination frequency and intensity, and cease and desist orders. 
We assume that the effectiveness of market discipline declines as the regulatory discipline is 
stronger (Billett et al. (1998)). Indeed, the incentives of market agents to intensively monitor 
and discipline banks could be weaker when regulators impose a stronger and tighter 
supervision. As such, regulatory discipline can, to some extent, be considered as a substitute 
for market discipline. As the deposit insurance scheme is one of the components of regulatory 
discipline, we conjecture that strong deposit insurer power undermines market discipline. We 
test this hypothesis by interacting the market discipline factor with the deposit insurer power 
dummy variable (DIPOW). The empirical results are reported in Table 5. 
 
< Insert Table 5 > 
 
 
Table 5 shows, as previously, that stronger deposit insurer power (DIPOW) is 
significantly associated with lower risk taking. Besides, market discipline is effective to 
reduce bank risk taking measured by the standard deviation of ROE (SDROE) or ROA 
(SDROA) when the power of the deposit insurer is low. A one standard deviation increase in 
interbank deposits (MKD) reduces SDROE by 22.93% of its mean and SDROA by 15.62% of 
its mean for banks located in countries with low deposit insurer power.  
By contrast, the results of the tests at the bottom of Table 5 indicate that the market discipline 
variable is not significant when the power of the deposit insurer is high. This result confirms 
19 
that strong deposit insurer power undermines market discipline. When the extent of the 
insurer’s attributions is higher, the market appears to have lower incentives to monitor banks. 
 
 
       4.2.3. Banking crisis resolution strategies  
All the countries in our sample experienced a systemic banking crisis or at least 
borderline and small (non-systemic) banking crises, before or at the beginning of our sample 
period. As noted above, these countries have followed different strategies in managing these 
crises. We explore whether the effect of market discipline is different for countries which 
have proceeded to massive recapitalizations and those which have adopted a mix of 
liquidation and restructuring. We hypothesize that the disciplining effect of interbank deposits 
will be higher in countries that have pursued liquidation than in those which have followed 
recapitalization policies. Indeed, creditors might fear losing their wealth in case of bank 
liquidation if they assume that the same resolution strategy would be adopted in case of crisis. 
 We examine this hypothesis by interacting the resolution strategy dummy variable 
(RESOL) with the market discipline factor (MKD), where RESOL equals one for countries 
which have adopted a mix of liquidation and restructuring to manage banking crises, and zero 
for those which have adopted recapitalization and restructuring. As shown by Table 6, the 
results indicate that market discipline is less effective in countries that had enforced bank 
liquidation policies in previous episodes of banking distress. Indeed, the market discipline 
factor is effective (MKD) in all specifications for countries that have adopted recapitalization 
and restructuring. A one standard deviation increase in interbank deposits (MKD) decreases 
the standard deviation of ROE (SDROE) by 18.75% of its mean and the standard deviation of 
ROA (SDROA) by 16.91% of its mean for banks located in countries that have undergone 
recapitalizations and restructuring in managing banking crises. Regarding the default risk the 
Z-SCORE is reduced by 14.71% of its mean. By contrast, for countries that have adopted a 
mix of liquidation and restructuring, the sum of the coefficients of the interaction term and the 
market discipline variable is significant only with the standard deviation of ROE (SDROE) as 
the dependent variable. Thus, market discipline leads to a lower risk taking of banks in 
countries that have proceeded to liquidations but it does not affect their insolvency risk.  
These results are not consistent with the assumption that countries that have pursued 
liquidation policies should exhibit higher market discipline. However, as discussed in section 
4.2.2, stronger regulatory discipline is also expected to undermine market discipline. Indeed, 
20 
when banks are supervised by a strict regulator that is known to liquidate an institution in the 
event of insolvency, the fear of punishment might lead banks to take less risk in the first 
place. This might weaken the incentives of market agents to discipline banks. Thus, our 
variable RESOL might reflect the strength of regulatory discipline rather than the credibility 
of non bail-out policies. As shown in Table 3, banks' insolvency risk (Z-SCORE) and asset 
risk (SDROE and SDROA) are lower in countries that have experienced actual liquidations. 
Thus, market discipline may be weaker, given the role played by the discipline introduced by 
the regulator.  
 
< Insert Table 6> 
 
 
 
5. Robustness checks  
 
To check the robustness of our results, we conduct several sensitivity analyses. 
First, we compute our dependent variables on 4-year rolling windows (see appendix 
C). The results are highly consistent with our previous findings regarding the effectiveness of 
market discipline and the impact of deposit insurer power, state ownership and resolution 
strategies.  
Second, to control for specificities at the country level, we exclude all country-level 
indexes used as control variables and replace them by country dummies.
21
 Considering these 
alternative control variables leads to similar results.
22
 
Third, to check the robustness of the deeper investigations on the effectiveness of 
market discipline, we run the regressions on sub-samples. Firstly, we separate countries that 
have high deposit insurer power (DIPOW=1) from countries with low deposit insurer power 
                                                 
21
Alternatively, it could be interesting to run single country regressions. However, we do not have enough 
observations for most of the countries in our sample. As a robustness check, we have analyzed the impact of 
market discipline on bank risk taking in Hungary (by running regressions on a sample restricted to banks located 
in Hungary). Indeed, Hungary is the country for which we have the highest number of observations with a stable 
number of banks on our sample period. Besides, our sample of Hungarian banks represents over 80% of the total 
Hungarian commercial banks’ assets. Running regressions on this single country leads to the same conclusion 
concerning the impact of market discipline on bank risk taking. We cannot analyze the impact of state ownership 
on the effectiveness of market discipline as this variable is not introduced in the regressions due to colinearity 
issues. Besides, as the deposit insurer power (DIPOW) and the banking crisis resolution strategies (RESOL) are 
not time-varying variables, it is not possible to measure their impact on market discipline in a within-country 
study. 
22
 Results are available upon request. 
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(DIPOW=0). We still find that market discipline is effective to reduce bank risk when the 
power of the insurer is low. When the power of the insurer is high, the market discipline 
variable is significant only with the standard deviation of the ROA (SDROA) as the dependent 
variable and only at the 10% level of significance (see Panel A in appendix D). Secondly, we 
separate countries that have conducted liquidation and restructuring (RESOL=1), from 
countries that have conducted extensive recapitalizations and restructuring (RESOL=0). On 
the whole, our results remain the same. Market discipline is weaker in countries that have 
experienced a mix of bank liquidations and restructuring than in countries that have pursued 
recapitalization and restructuring policies (see Panel B in the appendix D).
23
 
Fourth, we consider another threshold to construct the dummy variable STATE. Banks 
are considered state owned if at least 30% of the shares are controlled by the state. We 
construct the dummy variable STATE2 with this new definition. Considering this dummy 
variable leads to similar results (see appendix E).  
Fifth, we run the regressions excluding the banks that have experienced mergers or 
acquisitions during the period 1995-2006. This leads us to eliminate 19 banks. Our main 
conclusions remain unchanged.
24
 
 
 
6.  Conclusion  
 
The purpose of this study is to assess the disciplinary role of interbank deposits as well 
as the institutional and bank specific factors affecting its effectiveness. Using a sample of 207 
banks from 10 countries of Central and Eastern Europe, we find, by controlling for various 
factors, that interbank deposits do play a disciplinary role in the presence of explicit insurance 
and refrain banks from excessive risk taking. 
Our results also indicate that the market is more lenient with state owned-banks 
possibly because they are perceived as implicitly insured by the government even in the 
presence of explicit limited insurance. We also find that the extent of the insurer's power 
impacts market discipline: market discipline is effective only when deposit insurer power is 
low suggesting that the presence of a more powerful insurer undermines market discipline by 
                                                 
23
 We do not separately run regressions on a sub-sample restricted to state-owned banks and a sub-sample 
including private banks only because of an insufficient number of observations for the sub-sample of state-
owned banks. 
24
 Results are available upon request. 
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lowering the incentives of market participants to monitor banks. We consistently find that 
banks take less risk in countries with more powerful deposit insurers. Finally, we also show 
that when banks are supervised by a regulator that is more likely to liquidate failing 
institutions rather than to rescue them, they are less risky and market discipline is weaker: 
stronger regulatory discipline might be undermining market discipline.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
Table A1: Correlations between Independent Variables. 
 
  MKD EQTA LTA STATE NII SAVING GDPG RESOL LAW DIPOW 
MKD 1          
EQTA -0.065 1         
LTA -0.081 -0.528 1        
STATE 0.009 0.000 0.136 1       
NII 0.047 0.058 0.041 -0.081 1      
SAVING -0.109 -0.084 0.208 0.289 0.080 1     
GDPG -0.119 0.010 -0.018 -0.091 0.081 0.032 1    
RESOL -0.188 0.086 -0.122 -0.036 -0.018 -0.027 0.314 1   
LAW 0.231 -0.205 0.273 -0.030 -0.097 0.029 -0.142 -0.218 1  
DIPOW 0.046 -0.124 0.151 -0.084 0.046 0.008 -0.179 -0.162 0.211 1 
MKD = interbank deposits to total deposits ratio; EQTA = equity to assets ratio; NII = ratio of net interest income to total 
operating income; LTA = logarithm of total assets; GDPG = growth rate of real GDP; DIPOW = power of deposit insurance 
authority dummy variable. This dummy variable takes the value of one for countries that have a deposit insurance authority 
power index equals two or more, and zero otherwise; RESOL = crises resolution strategies dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 for country having proceeded to a combination of bank liquidation and restructuring, and 0 for country having 
made extensive restructuring and recapitalization of banks; LAW = rule of law. This variable takes value between 1 and 10, 
higher values suggesting a higher quality of law enforcement; STATE = state owned bank dummy variable. This dummy 
variable takes the value of one for banks in which state ownership represents at least 50 percent of total share, and zero 
otherwise; SAVING = state saving bank dummy variable. This dummy variable takes the value of one if the bank is a state 
saving bank on the year considered, and zero otherwise.  
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APPENDIX B  
 
TABLE B1: Impact of explicit deposit insurance on market discipline. 
 
Model specification:  
 
, , 0 1 2 , , 3 1 , , 2 , , ,( * )
' '
ji j t i j t i j t j t i t i j tRISK DEPINS MKD DEPINS MKD X Z u                          
 
VARIABLES SDROE SDROA Z-SCORE 
DEPINS 9.489*** 1.049*** -14.400* 
 (4.410) (3.671) (-1.730) 
MKD 0.096 -0.010 0.085 
 (0.823) (-0.983) (0.244) 
DEPINS*MKD -0.158 0.005 0.026 
 (-1.361) (0.430) (0.0766) 
 2 3   -0.062*** -0.006* 0.111 
 Risk level to reject : 2 3  = 0 0.007 0.096 0.148 
OBSERVATIONS 1142 1170 1156 
R-SQUARED 0.559 0.570 0.425 
The regressions contain the same control variables as those in Table 3 except that we control for country specificities by 
introducing country dummy variables instead of country-level invariant variables. We report only the coefficients on explicit 
deposit insurance scheme dummy variable, market discipline factor and the interaction term (explicit deposit insurance 
scheme dummy variable and the market discipline factor). Detailed results are available upon request. 
SDROA = standard deviation of the ROA; SDROE = standard deviation of the ROE; Z-SCORE = bank insolvency risk; 
DEPINS = explicit deposit insurance scheme. This dummy variable takes the value of one if there is an explicit deposit 
insurance scheme on the considered year and 0 otherwise; MKD = interbank deposits to total deposits ratio. Bank, time and 
country fixed effects are included but not reported. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** represent statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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APPENDIX C 
Table C1: Regressions using dependent variables computed on 4-year rolling windows 
Panel A model specification: , , 0 1 , , 1 , , 2 , , ,
' '
i j t i j t i j t j t i t i j tRISK MKD X Z u             
Panel B, C and D model specification: , , 0 1 , , 2 1 , , 2 , , ,( * )
' '
i j t i j t i j t j t i t i j tRISK MKD DUM MKD X Z u               with DUM= DIPOW, RESOL, and STATE respectively 
 
Panel A:Effectiveness of interbank 
deposits as market discipline factor  
Panel B:Influence of the deposit 
insurer power on the effectiveness of 
market discipline  
Panel C:Influence of  the banking 
crisis resolution strategy on the 
effectiveness of market discipline  
Panel D:Influence of implicit 
insurance through state ownership on 
the effectiveness of market discipline 
 VARIABLES SDROE SDROA Z-SCORE SDROE SDROA Z-SCORE SDROE SDROA Z-SCORE SDROE SDROA Z-SCORE 
MKD -0.061** -0.006* 0.028 -0.069*** -0.007* 0.043 -0.062** -0.007* 0.087 -0.065*** -0.009** 0.049 
 
(-2.524) (-1.823) (0.590) (-2.754) (-1.948) (0.789) (-2.219) (-1.824) (1.472) (-2.585) (-2.561) (1.012) 
DIPOW -26.760*** -1.514*** 55.950*** -27.540*** -3.180*** 15.760* -26.700*** -3.085*** 54.160*** -26.820*** -3.054*** 56.990*** 
 
(-13.680) (-2.600) (14.930) (-10.950) (-9.048) (1.933) (-13.240) (-9.812) (14.300) (-13.490) (-10.270) (14.860) 
DIPOW*MKD 
  
  0.026 0.002 -0.057   
 
  
   
   
  (0.499) (0.303) (-0.607)   
 
  
   RESOL -14.620*** -1.116*** 35.310*** -14.550*** -0.860* 23.820*** -14.770*** -0.962* 41.410*** -14.410*** -0.528 34.870*** 
 
(-7.163) (-4.003) (6.542) (-7.181) (-1.694) (4.157) (-6.285) (-1.810) (6.960) (-6.934) (-1.125) (6.404) 
RESOL*MKD 
  
    
 
  0.005 0.004 -0.227** 
   
   
    
 
  (0.102) (0.630) (-2.170) 
   STATE -4.940** -0.175 10.230** -4.935** -0.179 10.170** -4.935** -0.175 10.300** -6.269** -0.790* 16.440*** 
 
(-2.414) (-0.394) (2.039) (-2.405) (-0.405) (2.024) (-2.408) (-0.392) (2.049) (-2.555) (-1.795) (2.602) 
STATE*MKD 
  
    
 
    
 
  0.064 0.029* -0.327* 
   
    
 
    
 
  (1.015) (1.751) (-1.852) 
 1 2
         -0.043 -0.005 -0.013 -0.057 -0.003 -0.140 -0,001 0,02 -0,278 
 Risk level to reject : 1 2  = 0       0.385 0.462 0.864 0.179 0.625 0.108 0.981 0.216 0.110 
OBSERVATIONS 883 940 888 883 940 888 883 940 888 883 940 888 
R-SQUARED 0.682 0.781 0.618 0.682 0.781 0.618 0.682 0.781 0.621 0.682 0.783 0.620 
The regressions contain the same control variables as those in Tables 3. We report only the coefficients on market discipline factor, dummy variable of interest, and the interaction term (dummy 
variable and the market discipline factor). Detailed results are available upon request. SDROA = standard deviation of the ROA; SDROE = standard deviation of the ROE; Z-SCORE = bank 
insolvency risk; MKD = interbank deposits to total deposits ratio. DIPOW = power of deposit insurance authority dummy variable. This dummy variable takes the value of one for countries that 
have a deposit insurance authority power index equals two or more, and zero otherwise; RESOL = crises resolution strategies dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for country having 
proceeded to a combination of bank liquidation and restructuring, and 0 for country having made extensive restructuring and recapitalization of banks; STATE = state owned bank dummy 
variable. This dummy variable takes the value of one for banks in which state ownership represents at least 50 percent of total share, and zero otherwise. Bank and time fixed effects are included 
but not reported. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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APPENDIX D 
 
Table D1: Regressions on sub-samples  
 
Panel A and B model specification:  
, , 0 1 , , 1 , , 2 , , ,
' '
i j t i j t i j t j t i t i j tRISK MKD X Z u                    
 
 
 
 
Panel A: Influence of the deposit insurer power on the effectiveness of market discipline 
  High deposit insurer power Low deposit insurer power 
VARIABLES SDROE SDROA Z-SCORE SDROE SDROA Z-SCORE 
MKD -0.073 -0.006* 0.230 -0.0427** -0.00960** 0.0616 
 (-1.236) (-1.661) (1.065) (-2.149) (-2.403) (0.747) 
Observations 350 342 342 696 739 737 
R-squared 0.513 0.654 0.442 0.632 0.650 0.468 
  
Panel B: Influence of the banking crisis resolution strategy on the effectiveness of market 
discipline 
 
Countries having proceeded to a mix of 
recapitalizations and liquidations 
Countries having proceeded to recapitalizations 
VARIABLES SDROE SDROA Z-SCORE SDROE SDROA Z-SCORE 
MKD -0.094** -0.004 -0.039 -0.052** -0.009** 0.191* 
 (-2.395) (-0.799) (-0.404) (-2.045) (-2.072) (1.818) 
OBSERVATIONS 269 275 266 783 802 796 
R-SQUARED 0.803 0.827 0.681 0.441 0.592 0.436 
The regressions contain the same variables as those in Table 3 except the power of deposit insurance authority dummy 
variable in Panel A and the crises resolution strategies dummy variable in Panel B. Besides, the dummy variable SAVING is 
not included in the regressions on the sub-sample of banks located in countries with low deposit insurer power due to strong 
correlation between this variable and STATE and cannot be introduced on the sub-sample of banks located in countries that 
have proceeded to a mix of recapitalizations and liquidations (when the dependent variable is SDROE or Z-SCORE) due to 
colinearity issues. We report only the coefficients on market discipline factor. Detailed results are available upon request.   
SDROA = standard deviation of the ROA; SDROE = standard deviation of the ROE; Z-SCORE = bank insolvency risk; MKD 
= interbank deposits to total deposits ratio. Bank and time fixed effects are included but not reported. Robust t-statistics are in 
parentheses. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The power of the 
deposit insurer is considered high for countries that have a deposit insurance authority power index equals two or more. It is 
considered low for countries that have a deposit insurance authority power index equals 0 or 1. 
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APPENDIX E 
 
Table E1: Regressions using another definition of state-owned banks. 
 
Model specification:  
, , 0 1 , , 2 1 , , 2 , , ,( 2* )
' '
i j t i j t i j t j t i t i j tRISK MKD STATE MKD X Z u             
                                     
 
VARIABLES SDROE SDROA Z-SCORE 
MKD -0.085*** -0.012*** 0.157* 
 (-3.200) (-3.488) (1.943) 
STATE2*MKD 0.188*** 0.038*** -0.199 
 (3.312) (2.759) (-0.665) 
STATE2 -9.949*** -1.136*** 18.170** 
 (-4.305) (-2.868) (2.161) 
 1 2
 
 0.103** 0.026* -0.042 
 Risk level to reject : 1 2  = 0 0.047 0.052 0.887 
OBSERVATIONS 1060 1083 1080 
R-SQUARED 0.539 0.572 0.472 
The regressions contain the same control variables as those in Table 3. We report only the coefficients on state-owned bank 
dummy variable, market discipline factor, and the interaction term (state owned bank dummy variable and the market 
discipline variable). Detailed results are available upon request.   
SDROA = standard deviation of the ROA; SDROE = standard deviation of the ROE; Z-SCORE = bank insolvency risk; MKD 
= interbank deposits to total deposits ratio. STATE2 = state owned bank dummy variable. This dummy variable takes the 
value of one for banks in which state ownership represents at least 30 percent of total share, and zero otherwise. Bank and 
time fixed effects are included but not reported. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** represent statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics on Summary Accounting Information. 
  
Full sample of commercial banks available in 
Bankscope (324 banks) 
Our sample (207 banks) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Total assets (€ th.) 1,724,172 3,846,473 957 3.70E+07 1,797,062 3,988,865 957 3.70E+07 
ROA (%) 0.85 4.64 -46.25 65.61 0.98 4.23 -44.12 65,61 
Equity/ Total assets (%) 13.80 13.52 -99.98 98.45 13.18 9.91 2.79 68.20 
Deposits/ Total assets (%) 75.94 16.26 0 100 76.16 16.14 0 98.51 
Net loans/ Total assets (%) 45.47 19.97 0 98.01 44.59 19.58 0 97.24 
Net interest margin (%) 5.09 4.59 -35.84 73.01 4.97 3.95 -31.58 35.15 
Off balance sheet/ Total 
assets (%) 16.96 19.32 0 100 17.09 19.48 0 99.72 
NB: descriptive statistics are computed on the 1995-2006 period with the restriction that there is an explicit 
deposit insurance scheme in the considered country. 
 
 
 
 
 
33 
Table 2: Definition of the dependent and independent variables and descriptive statistics on our sample. 
Variables name Description Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Sources 
Dependent variables             
SDROA The 3-year rolling window standard deviation of the ROA (return on assets). 1.57 3.19 0.009 39.63 
Bankscope and author's 
calculations 
SDROE The 3-year rolling window standard deviation of the ROE (return on equity). 9.96 18.34 0.06 427.64 
Bankscope and author's 
calculations 
Z-SCORE 
Z-SCORE=(ROA+EQTA)/SDROA,  where ROA is the 3-year rolling window average 
return on average assets, eqta is the 3-year rolling window average ratio of Total equity to 
total assets; sdroa is the 3-year rolling window  standard deviation of  the ROA. 
39.94 78.38 -0.22 1,408.73 
Bankscope and author's 
calculations 
Bank level variables             
MKD Ratio of deposits due to banks to total deposits (%). 28.57 26.47 0 100 
Bankscope and author's 
calculations 
EQTA Ratio of equity to total assets (%). 13.18 9.91 2.79 68.20 
Bankscope and author's 
calculations 
LTA Natural logarithm of total assets. 13.06 1.67 6.86 17.43 
Bankscope and author's 
calculations 
STATE 
Dummy variable that takes the value of one for state owned bank that is if the share of state 
ownership in bank total ownership is higher than 50 percent, and zero otherwise. 
0.08 0.28 0 1 
Bankscope and author's 
calculations 
NII Ratio of net interest income to total operating income (%). 58.44 20.91 -106.50 99.99 
Bankscope and author's 
calculations 
SAVING 
Saving bank dummy. This dummy variable takes the value of one if the bank is a state 
saving bank on the year considered, and zero otherwise.  
 
0.02 0.14 0 1 
Bankscope and author's 
calculations 
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Table 2- Continues 
Variables name Description Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Sources 
Country level 
variables 
            
GDPG Real GDP growth rate (%). 4.20 3.16 -9.40 11.93 
World Development 
Indicators 
RESOL 
Crisis resolution adopted strategies dummy variable  that takes the value of 1  for  
country having proceeded to a combination of bank liquidation and restructuring, and 0 
for country having made extensive restructuring and recapitalization of banks  
0.24 0.43 0 1 
Tang et al. (2000) 
Dinger and Von Hagen 
(2009) 
LAW 
Assessment of law and order tradition in the country. This variable takes value between 
1 and 10, higher values suggesting a higher quality of law enforcement 
7.65 1.17 5.60 8.70 
Pistor, Raiser and 
Gelfer (2000) 
DIPOW 
Deposit insurer power determined by adding 1 if the answer is yes and zero otherwise 
for each of the following questions: (1) Does deposit insurance authority make the 
decision to intervene a bank? (2) Can deposit insurance agency take legal action against 
bank directors/officials? (3)Has the deposit insurance agency ever taken any legal action 
against bank directors/officials? 
The dummy variable DIPOW takes the value of one if the deposit insurer power is high 
that is if the number of “yes” answers is 2 or 3, and 0 otherwise. 
0.27 0.44 0 1 
World Bank Database, 
Barth et al. (2003) and 
author's calculations 
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Table 3: Effectiveness of interbank deposits as market discipline factor. 
 
Model specification: 
 
 
 
, , 0 1 , , 1 , , 2 , , ,
' '
i j t i j t i j t j t i t i j tRISK MKD X Z u                                        
               
 
 
VARIABLES SDROE SDROA Z-SCORE 
MKD -0.068*** -0.008** 0.141* 
 (-2.799) (-2.182) (1.712) 
EQTA -0.456*** -0.023* 0.693** 
 (-5.484) (-1.687) (2.561) 
LTA -4.396*** -0.689*** 5.236* 
 (-3.803) (-4.715) (1.741) 
STATE -5.849*** -0.140 10.68 
 (-2.804) (-0.335) (1.315) 
NII 0.010 -0.011** -0.087 
 (0.336) (-2.515) (-1.099) 
SAVING -1.119 -0.986*** 5.194 
 (-0.439) (-3.374) (0.289) 
GDPG -0.508*** -0.166*** 1.469*** 
 (-2.827) (-4.168) (2.703) 
RESOL -6.540** -1.028*** 50.880*** 
 (-2.008) (-4.030) (6.814) 
LAW -2.919*** -0.373*** 51.600*** 
 (-2.608) (-4.302) (21.810) 
DIPOW -8.399** -0.376* -13.520 
 (-2.533) (-1.867) (-1.122) 
CONSTANT 111.700*** 15.580*** -405.100*** 
  (7.643) (6.991) (-8.881) 
OBSERVATIONS 1060 1083 1080 
R-SQUARED 0.534 0.563 0.470 
SDROA = standard deviation of the ROA; SDROE = standard deviation of the ROE; Z-SCORE = bank insolvency risk; MKD 
= interbank deposits to total deposits ratio; EQTA = equity to assets ratio; NII = ratio of net interest income to total operating 
income; LTA = logarithm of total assets; GDPG = growth rate of real GDP; DIPOW = power of deposit insurance authority 
dummy variable. This dummy variable takes the value of one for countries that have a deposit insurance authority power 
index equals two or more, and zero otherwise; RESOL = crises resolution strategies dummy variable that takes the value of 1 
for country having proceeded to a combination of bank liquidation and restructuring, and 0 for country having made 
extensive restructuring and recapitalization of banks; LAW = rule of law. This variable takes value between 1 and 10, higher 
values suggesting a higher quality of law enforcement; STATE = state owned bank dummy variable. This dummy variable 
takes the value of one for banks in which state ownership represents at least 50 percent of total share, and zero otherwise; 
SAVING = state saving bank dummy variable. This dummy variable takes the value of one if the bank is a state saving bank 
on the year considered, and zero otherwise. Bank and time fixed effects are included but not reported. Robust t-statistics are 
in parentheses. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4: Influence of implicit insurance through state ownership on the 
effectiveness of market discipline. 
Model specification:  
 
, , 0 1 , , 2 1 , , 2 , , ,( * )
' '
i j t i j t i j t j t i t i j tRISK MKD STATE MKD X Z u                              
  
VARIABLES SDROE SDROA Z-SCORE 
MKD -0.077*** -0.010*** 0.151* 
 (-2.959) (-2.869) (1.889) 
STATE *MKD 0.117* 0.0301** -0.126 
 (1.933) (2.032) (-0.438) 
EQTA -0.461*** -0.024* 0.698*** 
 (-5.532) (-1.747) (2.590) 
LTA -4.451*** -0.698*** 5.286* 
 (-3.852) (-4.768) (1.761) 
STATE -8.512*** -0.882** 13.440 
 (-3.731) (-2.297) (1.586) 
NII 0.010 -0.011** -0.088 
 (0.362) (-2.511) (-1.119) 
SAVING -0.608 -0.825*** 4.714 
 (-0.245) (-2.962) (0.262) 
GDPG -0.531*** -0.169*** 1.483*** 
 (-2.944) (-4.261) (2.738) 
RESOL -6.020* -1.194*** 49.810*** 
 (-1.839) (-4.388) (6.018) 
LAW -3.051*** -0.345*** 50.960*** 
 (-2.752) (-3.962) (18.010) 
DIPOW -9.817*** -0.453** -13.790 
 (-2.787) (-2.223) (-1.163) 
CONSTANT 114.800*** 15.760*** -401.300*** 
 (7.877) (7.050) (-8.434) 
   1 2   0.040 0.020 0.025 
 Risk level to reject : 
1 2
  = 0 0.470 0.166 0.935 
OBSERVATIONS 1060 1083 1080 
R-SQUARED 0.536 0.569 0.470 
SDROA = standard deviation of the ROA; SDROE = standard deviation of the ROE; Z-SCORE = bank insolvency 
risk; MKD = interbank deposits to total deposits ratio; EQTA = equity to assets ratio; NII = ratio of net interest 
income to total operating income; LTA = logarithm of total assets; GDPG = growth rate of real GDP; DIPOW = 
power of deposit insurance authority dummy variable. This dummy variable takes the value of one for countries 
that have a deposit insurance authority power index equals two or more, and zero otherwise; RESOL = crises 
resolution strategies dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for country having proceeded to a combination of 
bank liquidation and restructuring, and 0 for country having made extensive restructuring and recapitalization of 
banks; LAW = rule of law. This variable takes value between 1 and 10, higher values suggesting a higher quality of 
law enforcement; STATE =state owned bank dummy variable. This dummy variable takes the value of one for 
banks in which state ownership represents at least 50 percent of total share, and zero otherwise; SAVING = state 
saving bank dummy variable. This dummy variable takes the value of one if the bank is a state saving bank on the 
year considered, and zero otherwise. Bank and time fixed effects are included but not reported. Robust t-statistics 
are in parentheses. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5: Influence of the deposit insurer power on the effectiveness of market 
discipline. 
Model specification:  
 
, , 0 1 , , 2 1 , , 2 , , ,( * )
' '
i j t i j t i j t j t i t i j tRISK MKD DIPOW MKD X Z u                               
 
VARIABLES SDROE SDROA Z-SCORE 
MKD -0.074*** -0.007* 0.083 
 (-2.844) (-1.784) (1.042) 
DIPOW*MKD 0.024 -0.003 0.218 
 (0.486) (-0.396) (1.085) 
EQTA -0.456*** -0.0233* 0.686** 
 (-5.504) (-1.679) (2.547) 
LTA -4.429*** -0.685*** 4.948* 
 (-3.802) (-4.623) (1.654) 
STATE -5.858*** -0.135 10.560 
 (-2.798) (-0.326) (1.325) 
NII 0.011 -0.011** -0.077 
 (0.379) (-2.520) (-0.986) 
SAVING -0.970 -1.005*** 6.418 
 (-0.378) (-3.444) (0.358) 
GDPG -0.502*** -0.166*** 1.487*** 
 (-2.815) (-4.157) (2.743) 
RESOL -6.725** -1.071*** 50.720*** 
 (-2.064) (-3.812) (6.886) 
LAW -2.759** -0.410*** 53.04*** 
 (-2.373) (-3.990) (21.20) 
DIPOW -8.907*** -0.236 -18.39 
 (-2.596) (-0.688) (-1.418) 
CONSTANT 111.100*** 15.790*** -410.300*** 
 (7.654) (7.085) (-8.938) 
  1 2   -0.050 -0.010 0.301 
 Risk level to reject : 
1 2
  = 0 0.278 0.173 0.123 
OBSERVATIONS 1060 1083 1080 
R-SQUARED 0.535 0.563 0.471 
SDROA = standard deviation of the ROA; SDROE = standard deviation of the ROE; Z-SCORE = bank insolvency 
risk; MKD = interbank deposits to total deposits ratio; EQTA = equity to assets ratio; NII = ratio of net interest 
income to total operating income; LTA = logarithm of total assets; GDPG = growth rate of real GDP; DIPOW = 
power of deposit insurance authority dummy variable. This dummy variable takes the value of one for countries 
that have a deposit insurance authority power index equals two or more, and zero otherwise; RESOL = crises 
resolution strategies dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for country having proceeded to a combination of 
bank liquidation and restructuring, and 0 for country having made extensive restructuring and recapitalization of 
banks; LAW = rule of law. This variable takes value between 1 and 10, higher values suggesting a higher quality of 
law enforcement; STATE = state owned bank dummy variable. This dummy variable takes the value of one for 
banks in which state ownership represents at least 50 percent of total share, and zero otherwise; SAVING = state 
saving bank dummy variable. This dummy variable takes the value of one if the bank is a state saving bank on the 
year considered, and zero otherwise. Bank and time fixed effects are included but not reported. Robust t-statistics 
are in parentheses. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6: Influence of the banking crisis resolution strategy on the effectiveness of 
market discipline. 
Model specification:  
 
, , 0 1 , , 2 1 , , 2 , , ,( * )
' '
i j t i j t i j t j t i t i j tRISK MKD RESOL MKD X Z u                              
VARIABLES SDROE SDROA Z-SCORE 
MKD -0.061** -0.007* 0.200** 
 (-2.249) (-1.793) (2.001) 
RESOL*MKD -0.028 -0.001 -0.241 
 (-0.583) (-0.210) (-1.433) 
EQTA -0.456*** -0.0234* 0.689** 
 (-5.468) (-1.687) (2.566) 
LTA -4.406*** -0.690*** 5.108* 
 (-3.817) (-4.724) (1.697) 
STATE -5.847*** -0.140 10.810 
 (-2.810) (-0.335) (1.332) 
NII 0.010 -0.011** -0.086 
 (0.337) (-2.514) (-1.088) 
SAVING -1.035 -0.983*** 5.762 
 (-0.406) (-3.368) (0.321) 
GDPG -0.504*** -0.166*** 1.490*** 
 (-2.814) (-4.164) (2.738) 
RESOL -6.097* -0.989*** 55.580*** 
 (-1.889) (-3.003) (6.355) 
LAW -2.934*** -0.376*** 50.450*** 
 (-2.616) (-4.279) (19.43) 
DIPOW -8.005** -0.365* -10.850 
 (-2.343) (-1.728) (-0.898) 
CONSTANT 111.300*** 15.570*** -400.700*** 
 (7.590) (6.975) (-8.749) 
 1 2   -0.089** -0.009 -0.041 
 Risk level to reject : 
1 2
  = 0 0.039 0.130 0.767 
OBSERVATIONS 1060 1083 1080 
R-SQUARED 0.535 0.563 0.471 
SDROA = standard deviation of the ROA; SDROE = standard deviation of the ROE; Z-SCORE = bank insolvency 
risk; MKD = interbank deposits to total deposits ratio; EQTA=equity to assets ratio; NII= ratio of net interest 
income to total operating income; LTA = logarithm of total assets; GDPG = growth rate of real GDP; DIPOW = 
power of deposit insurance authority dummy variable. This dummy variable takes the value of one for countries 
that have a deposit insurance authority power index equals two or more, and zero otherwise; RESOL = crises 
resolution strategies dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for country having proceeded to a combination of 
bank liquidation and restructuring, and 0 for country having made extensive restructuring and recapitalization of 
banks; LAW = rule of law. This variable takes value between 1 and 10, higher values suggesting a higher quality of 
law enforcement; STATE = state owned bank dummy variable. This dummy variable takes the value of one for 
banks in which state ownership represents at least 50 percent of total share, and zero otherwise; SAVING = state 
saving bank dummy variable. This dummy variable takes the value of one if the bank is a state saving bank on the 
year considered, and zero otherwise. Bank and time fixed effects are included but not reported. Robust t-statistics 
are in parentheses. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
